Abstract-Millimeter-wave (mmWave) using conventional phased array (CPA) enables highly directional and fixed angular beamforming (FAB), therefore enhancing physical layer security (PLS) in the angular domain. However, as the eavesdropper is located in the direction pointed by the mainlobe of the information-carrying beam, information leakage is inevitable and FAB cannot guarantee PLS performance. To address this threat, we propose a novel fixed region beamforming (FRB) by employing a frequency diverse subarray (FDSA) architecture to enhance the PLS performance for mmWave communications. In particular, we carefully introduce multiple frequency offset increments (FOIs) across subarrays to achieve a sophisticated beampattern synthesis that ensures a confined information transmission only within the desired angle-range region (DARR) in close vicinity of the target user. More specifically, we formulate the secrecy rate maximization problem with FRB over possible subarray FOIs, and consider two cases of interests, i.e., without/with the location information of eavesdropping, both turn out to be NPhard. For the unknown eavesdropping location case, we propose a seeker optimization algorithm to minimize the maximum sidelobe peak of the beampattern outside the DARR. As for the known eavesdropping location case, a block coordinate descend linear approximation algorithm is proposed to minimize the sidelobe level in the eavesdropping region. Moreover, we propose an inverted subarray subset technique to further randomize the sidelobes against sensitive eavesdropping. By using the proposed FRB, the mainlobes of all subarrays are constructively superimposed in the DARR while the sidelobes are destructively overlayed outside the DARR. Therefore, FRB exhibits prominent effect on confining information transmission within the DARR. Numerical simulations demonstrate that the proposed FDSA-based FRB can provide superior PLS performance over the CPA-based FAB. 
I. INTRODUCTION

S
ECURE communication is one of the major requirements for wireless systems. Conventional security approach in wireless communications is encryption [1] , [2] in the upperlayer with the assumption that the eavesdropper has limited computational capability. But the wide angular broadcasting nature of wireless medium makes wireless systems vulnerable to eavesdropping. Recently, physical layer security (PLS) is emerging as an alternative security paradigm that explores the randomness of the wireless channel to achieve confidentiality and authentication [3] - [5] . PLS approach has some unique advantages over the existing upper-layer method. For example, no heavy upper-layer cryptographic algorithm is needed, no additional computing resource is required, and PLS is naturally immune to the brute force attack [6] - [8] . Aiming at wider bandwidth and hence higher rate of wireless data transmission, the move to higher frequency band, such as millimeter-wave (mmWave) band, has been actively standardized in the fifth generation (5G) cellular system [9] - [12] . The beamforming technology based on multi-antenna phased array is regarded as a feasible solution to compensate the severe path loss and absorption in mmWave communications [13] . The feature of ultra-short wavelength of mmWave enables the very compact antenna array of a large number of elements, which further promotes the application of beamforming.
In recent years, the researches on beamforming technology for PLS have received more and more attention in mmWave communications [14] - [22] . The essence of PLS with beamforming technology is to maximize the secrecy rate by exploiting the spatial degree of freedom (DoF) to improve the rate of a legitimate user while degrading the rate of an eavesdropper. Through mainlobe reinforcement and sidelobe suppression, the fixed angular beamforming (FAB) with conventional phased array (CPA) can guarantee the PLS [23] - [25] . But an eavesdropper with a sensitive receiver is still able to intercept the communication link via a sidelobe. Thus, the sidelobe randomization techniques [24] - [29] of angular beamforming are proposed to improve the PLS performance. The work in [30] proposes beamforming schemes to enhance the security of satellite network by using the green interference from the terrestrial network. The works in [31] , [32] See https://www.ieee.org/publications/rights/index.html for more information. hybrid beamforming schemes to opportunistically inject artificial noise in the null space of the target receiver for mmWave channels. However, the aforementioned secure techniques fail if a malicious eavesdropper captures the mainlobe direction and moves in the beam direction, as shown in Fig. 1 . More recently, angle-range beamforming techniques [33] - [36] are proposed to tackle the above challenge. The works in [33] - [35] propose an interesting rotated angular beamforming (RAB) with frequency diverse array (FDA) to control the mainlobe to circumvent a well-localization eavesdropper. The work in [36] utilizes the ground-reflected path in the beam design to generate angle-range-dependent transmission and randomize the sidelobe outside the target region.
In this paper, we propose a novel fixed region beamforming (FRB) using frequency diverse subarray (FDSA) to address the mainlobe eavesdropping threat that is inherent in the existing beamforming. The mainlobe generated by the proposed FRB focuses only in a desired angle-range region (DARR) or target region, where the subarray mainlobes are constructively superimposed within the target region while the subbeams are destructively overlayed outside the target region. Sidelobe randomization technique with inverted subarray subset is used to deal with a sensitive eavesdropper. As a beneficial result, the resultant mainlobe outside the target region cannot be produced, and the beampattern gain inside the target region is much higher than that outside the target region. More specifically, the proposed FRB exploits the DoF of frequency to generate an angle-range-dependent beampattern, which makes it possible to produce very low sidelobe in any region outside the target region. In particular, we propose two algorithms to select the optimal frequency offset increment (FOI) vectors for secrecy rate maximization (SRM). As illustrated in Table I , our proposed FRB distinguishes itself from the existing works in two important aspects, i.e., the beampattern control mechanism and the PLS-enhancement solution. Firstly, we use the angle-range-dependent beamforming with frequency diverse subarray to eliminate the high sidelobes outside the target region. In contrast to our scheme, the existing angle-dependent schemes in [23] - [32] use single frequency array to achieve only angle-dependent beamforming, which can not distinguish the eavesdropper and the target receiver in the mainlobe direction. Consequently, the secure problem of mainlobe appears. Secondly, our proposed PLS-enhancement solutions with sidelobe suppression and sidelobe randomization are transparent to the receiver. But the target receiver in [36] needs to identify and conjugate the ground-reflected signal, which increases the complexity. Moreover, the key contributions and new features of this paper are summarized as follows.
• We propose a novel FDSA-based FRB transmission scheme to enhance PLS for mmWave wireless communications. In contrast to the existing angular beamforming that only generates an angle-confined beam, the proposed FRB can generate an angle-and-range double confined beam by exploiting the DoF of frequency. The sidelobe outside the target region, even along the target direction, is attenuated dramatically by the destructive superposition of subbeam. Consequently, the proposed FRB with sidelobe randomization can address the mainlobe threat that is inherent in the existing angular beamforming.
• We propose a FRB optimization scheme without the location information of eavesdropping. In particular, we formulate the SRM problem which minimizes the maximum sidelobe peak outside the desired angle range region. Aiming to solve the NP-hard problem, we propose a seeker optimization algorithm (SOA), which efficiently pursuits the optimized FOI vector across the subarray with fast convergence. The case study is of practical interests in the sense that the eavesdropper may hide itself. Only if the transmitter has the knowledge of the target receiver's location, the worst-case optimization can guarantee basic PLS performance.
• We also propose a FRB optimization scheme with the location information of eavesdropping. In this case the objective of the SRM problem is to minimize the sidelobe level in the known eavesdropping location. Noting the problem is again NP-hard, we propose a block coordinate descend linear approximation algorithm (BCDLA) to efficiently find the optimized FOI vector. 
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, the elements of the proposed FRB transmission are introduced by presenting the transmitter architecture, system model and two directional beamforming schemes which are supportable by FRB.
A. Transmitter Architecture
As shown in Fig. 2 , the transmitter consists of M FDSAs plus a frequency offset module at each branch. The bits of secret information are modulated in the baseband domain. Then the baseband signal is up-converted by f c through the mixer, and divided into L signal copies. Each copy is converted again by an extra tiny frequency offset before phase shifting. Finally, the phase shifted signal is amplified by a power amplifier and loaded to the antenna.
For simplicity, we consider a uniform linear array (ULA) with an inter-element space of d ≤ 0.5λ, where λ is wavelength. The ULA is divided into M non-overlapped FDSAs, denoted as S 0 , S 1 , . . ., S M−1 , respectively. f m,n denotes the frequency offset in the n-th element of the m-th subarray. Each subarray consists of N elements, i.e., the ULA has L = M N elements. The frequency difference between adjacent elements in subarray S m is f m = f m,n+1 − f m,n , which is defined as FOI in subsequent section. Note the equal difference feature of frequency offset is helpful to reduce the complexity of beampattern optimization algorithm.
B. System Model
We consider a multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) mmWave wireless communication system with a L-antenna transmitter (Alice) and two N r -antenna receivers (Bob and Eve) in the line-of-sight (LoS) environment. Alice knows the exact location (θ T , R T ) of Bob but may not know the location of Eve in general. For simplicity, we only consider the directional LoS channel since the multi-path components (MPCs) are very sparse and relatively weak in mmWave transmission [24] , [25] , [32] , [37] , which can be ignored. This assumption is acceptable in LoS mmWave communications 
because the MPCs are often attenuated by 20 dB as compared to the LoS component [33] , [35] , [38] .
As we assume the ULA is positioned on the x-y plane, the receiver direction can be identified by the azimuth angle θ only. The LoS channel matrix H is given by
where √ P L (R) denotes the path loss factor at location (θ, R), θ AO A and θ AO D denote the angle of arrival (AOA) at receiver and the angle of departure (AOD) at transmitter, respectively. The steering vectors are defined as
where
where P T is the transmission power, G R denotes the received power factor. f ∈ C N r ×1 denotes the combiner of received beamforming. The optimal normalized combiner is f(
. In order to study the impact of transmit beamforming, we assume that Bob and Eve's antennas are aligned to Alice, i.e., the combiners are optimal. Thus,
is channel vector, w ∈ C L×1 is the transmit beamforming vector, B(θ, R) = h * w denotes the array factor at location (θ, R), x is the modulated transmit signal with E[|x| 2 ] = 1, and η ∼ N (0, σ 2 ) is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with zero mean and σ 2 variance.
C. Directional Beamforming Techniques
Based on the proposed FDSA architecture, we can perform two different directional beamforming techniques by adjusting the FOIs, which are discussed as follows. 
1) Fixed Angular Beamforming:
The FDSA architecture in Fig. 2 is simplified to a CPA architecture when the frequency offset is zero, i.e., f m,n = 0, ∀m, n. In this special case, the simplified FDSA can also support FAB along the target direction with L elements. The channel vector in this case is written as [39] 
is the path loss factor at the range R, a(θ ) is array steering vector.
In order to highlight the beamforming gain, we temporarily ignore the path loss factor for clarity. The transmitter can steer its mainlobe along θ T by setting w = a(θ T ) L . Then the array factor of FAB along any direction θ is denoted as
Since the array factor is a constant along the direction θ , the beampattern of FAB is range-independent. As shown in Fig. 3 , the beampattern is highly directional. However, there is an inherent mainlobe threat for FAB. More specifically, the PLS of conventional directional beamforming plus sidelobe randomization [24] - [29] is effective when Eve is located outside the mainlobe angular sector, but it is entirely ineffective when Eve locates inside the mainlobe angular sector, i.e., θ ≈ θ T , even Eve is far away from Bob. Intuitively, if the mainlobe pattern can be controlled to circumvent the eavesdropper, the security threat in the target direction may be solved.
2) Rotated Angular Beamforming: In Fig. 2 , assume that the frequency difference between adjacent elements is a constant, i.e., f = f m,n+1 − f m,n = f m+1,0 − f m,N−1 , ∀m, n, then, the FDSA becomes a uniform linear FDA [40] , [41] with L elements and one FOI f . Thus, the radiated frequency of the l-th antenna in the FDA is expressed as
where f c denotes the RF oscillator's frequency. Thus, the frequency vector of FDA is expressed as Assume the location (θ, R) is a far-field point. Thus, the propagation range from the l-th element to the location (θ, R) is expressed as [40] , [41] 
The phase difference between the l-th element and the array center is written as [40] , [41] 
Note that in (10), the expression is identical to CPA-based FAB when f = 0. The second term on the righthand side (RHS) of (10) shows that the phase difference of RAB is range-dependent and the third term can be neglected when 0.5(L − 1) f f c [40] - [43] . The channel vector of RAB can be written as
where a(θ, R) is array steering vector of RAB, which is defined as
When we ignore path loss factor for simplicity, the array factor of FDA-based RAB is calculated as
is the steering weight vector,
. Notice that FDA-based RAB can be simplified to CPA-based FAB by setting f = 0. According to (13) , we know that the beampattern of RAB is anglerange-dependent while FAB is angle-dependent but rangeindependent.
As shown in Fig. 4 , the mainlobe pattern of RAB can circumvent the eavesdropper by controlling the rotated angle ϕ with FOI f . The pattern law of RAB is summarized as the following lemma [34] . 
Lemma 1:
The transmit beampattern of RAB has one mainlobe traversed the target location (θ T , R T ) and countless uniform spacing grating lobes paralleled with mainlobe in the angle-range space. The range difference R between the mainlobe and the most adjacent grating lobe is expressed as
The rotated angle ϕ between the mainlobe center and the cos θ -axis is expressed as
Proof: See Appendix A. According to the Lemma 1, we have some interesting observations which are summarized by the following corollaries.
Corollary 1: If f = 0, the transmit beampattern of RAB only depends on the angle parameter θ and the range parameter R is invalid.
Proof: Substituting f = 0 into (13), the FDA-based RAB is degraded to the CPA-based FAB. Then, the proof of Corollary 1 is finished.
Corollary 2: If f 1 and f 2 are the FOIs of FDA, and
• , then, the f 1 -resultant beampattern is symmetric with the f 2 -resultant beampattern along the R-axis in the cos θ -R plane.
Proof: Since
Thus, the f 1 -resultant beampattern and f 2 -resultant beampattern are symmetric along the R-axis.
Remark 1: According to Lemma 1, the impact of the grating lobes to the secure performance can be weakened greatly by setting R R T considering the severe path loss in mmWave. The narrow angular mainlobe path of RAB can be rotated flexibly around the target location by controlling the FOI f , which makes it possible to circumvent the eavesdropper with known location. As shown in Fig. 4 , the mainlobe path circumvents Eve1 who is located in the target direction θ T , and thus the PLS performance in the target direction is improved.
However, RAB is still confronted by another security threat, because the mainlobe is only rotated to another direction which might point to another eavesdropper, such as Eve2 in Fig. 4 . Noting the vulnerability of FAB, we propose FRB, a new beamforming solution, which is able to confine the mainlobe within a narrow angle-range region centered by the target user, namely the DARR, and suppresses the mainlobe gain outside the DARR for better PLS performance. In next section, we give detailed descriptions about FRB.
III. FRB TRANSMISSION TECHNIQUE
In this section, we introduce the beampattern and new features of the proposed FDSA-based FRB. The feature of mainlobe suppression outside DARR is characterized and the feature of maximum sidelobe peak is also summarized according the subbeam distribution, both serve as the preparations for PLS performance enhancement with the proposed FRB. The sidelobe randomization of inverted subarray subset is further proposed to tackle the sensitive eavesdropper.
A. Frequency Diverse Subarray
As shown in Fig. 5 , we divide the L elements of ULA into M non-overlapped FDSAs denoted as S 0 , S 1 , · · · , S M−1 , respectively. Each FDSA has N elements. The corresponding FOIs to these subarrays are
The frequency of the n-th element in subarray S m is expressed as
The propagation range from the n-th element of subarray S m to a far-field receiver is written as
(17) Thus, the phase difference m,n between the n-th element of subarray S m and the array center is expressed as
Note that the first two terms on the RHS of (18) are equal to the phase difference of the FDA-based RAB, which are also angle-range-dependent. The third term denotes the constant part of the phase difference in the m-th subarray S m , which plays an important role in the subbeam superposition of the proposed FRB. The last term has a vary small value given the assumption f m f c , and is far less important than the first term [40] - [43] . Therefore, we neglect the last term in the subsequent section.
B. FRB-Resultant Beampattern
The channel vector of the proposed FRB is expressed as
where a F R B (θ, R) is composite steering vector of the proposed FRB, and a m (θ, R) represents the corresponding steering vector of the m-th subarray with FOI f m , which is formulated by (11) . When we ignore the path loss factor, the channel vector is
Assuming the target user's location is (θ T , R T ), and the corresponding steering weight vector is
. Thus, the FRB-resultant beampattern can be expressed as
. Here ρ(θ) = e j (M−1−2m)Na is the phase shift factor of the resultant beampattern, which has constructive or destructive effect on the superposition of M subbeams. Only in the target region (θ, R) = (θ T , R T ), the resultant beampattern of our proposed FRB is constructively superimposed to achieve the maximum value of 1. Outside the target region, all the sidelobes, mainlobes and grating lobes of subbeams are destructively overlayed to generate the low resultant sidelobes of the proposed FRB. The amplitude of the FRB-resultant beampattern can be written as
Remark 2: As the phase shift factor ρ(θ) destroys the constructive superposition of subbeam's mainlobe, grating lobes and sidelobes, our proposed FRB can generate low resultant sidelobe outside the target region. Therefore, our proposed FRB scheme is effective in solving the security threat of the existing mainlobe or grating lobe. In practice, the total antenna number is a constant. Increasing M increases the DoF of ρ(θ) to suppress the sidelobe of FRB, but the number of element N in each subarray decreases and the subbeam's sidelobe increases, which is disadvantageous for FRB to generate low sidelobe. Therefore, we should strike a good balance between M and N. As a compromise, we select the combination that M is close to N to analyse the performance of FRB. When M and N are fixed, the FOI selection methods in Section IV become the key factor for the sidelobe suppression with FRB. Fig. 6(a) demonstrates the amplitude distribution of the proposed FRB in angle-range domain. Inside the DARR, the amplitude of the FRB-resultant beampattern reaches the maximum peak, which can provide very high received array gain for Bob. On the other hand, the amplitude is attenuated remarkably outside the DARR. In contrast to the pulse-shape beampattern of FRB in Fig. 6(a) , both FAB in Fig. 6(b) and RAB in Fig. 6(c) show the belt-shape beampattern in the anglerange domain, which implies the conceivable mainlobe threat.
C. Amplitude Feature of FRB-Resultant Beampattern
as the FOI vector of the FDSA-based FRB. According to Lemma 1, we can rotate the subbeam's mainlobe path towards the desired direction by controlling the FOI. As shown in Fig. 7 , the blue lines traversing the target location (cos θ T , R T ) are the mainlobe paths of subbeams, and the remaining blue lines are the grating lobe paths. The whole plane is partitioned into three regions according to the distribution of subarray mainlobe and grating lobe [41] , denoted as m , ms and s , respectively. In Fig. 7 
Proof: See Appendix B.
1 According to (56), the subbeam mainlobe paths do not intersect outside the target region (θ T , R T ). Thus, K 1 =1 in the subbeam mainlobe path and K 1 = 0 in the subbeam grating lobe path.
2 K 2 ∈ Z and 0 ≤ K 2 ≤ M − 1. Assume f i -subbeam mainlobe path intersects with f j -subbeam grating lobe path. According to (56), we have
. Then, at most (M − 1) subbeam grating lobes intersect with f i -subbeam mainlobe.
Corollary 3:
In angle-range space (0 ≤ θ ≤ π, 0 < R < R max ), the maximum sidelobe peak (cos θ n , R m,k ) of the FRB-resultant beampattern is confined in the ms region with
From (20), we know that the sidelobe peak of the proposed FRB is controlled by three parameters, namely, angle, range and FOIs. Furthermore, the locations of sidelobe peak vary with the FOIs, which brings extra difficulties in the beampattern optimization in next section.
Maximum sidelobe peak varies with multiple parameters, but it can be confined in some limited regions and then located quickly by Lemma 2 and Corollary 3, respectively. Remark 3: Lemma 3 indicates we only need to focus on a quarter of the cos θ − R plane to optimize the sidelobe, which significantly decreases the complexity of the following optimization problems in section IV.
D. Inverted Subarray Subset Technique
Although the proposed FRB suppresses the sidelobe to very low level, a sensitive eavesdropper with high receiving gain may still intercept the communication link via a sidelobe. In order to address the problem of sensitive eavesdropping, we further propose a FRB-based sidelobe randomization scheme of inverted subarray subset technique (ISST) [28] , [29] . Through randomly inverting some subarray's phase, ISST generates artificial noise (AN) towards Eve and degrades Eve's signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR).
As shown in Fig. 2 , Υ π is a random subset of M 1 subarrays used to shift an extra phase π, Υ 0 is a subset that contains the indices of the remaining (M−M 1 ) subarrays. Thus, in subarray S m , the n-th element of transmit beamforming vector is set as
where m,n (θ T , R T ) is the phase difference defined in (18), the size of the random subsets |Υ π | = M 1 and
Substituting (27) into (20), the FRB-resultant sidelobe under the inverted subarray subset is expressed as
, (28) where b m is a Bernoulli random variable, b m = −1 with probability
M and b m = 1 with probability
M . Lemma 4: For a large number M of subarrays, (θ, R) = (θ T , R T ), the random variable B s F R B (θ, R) in (28) converges to a complex Gaussian random variable with mean
and variance
. (30) Proof: See Appendix D. Based on the Lemma 4, we can further analyze the robustness of PLS. The average SINR in sidelobe region is derived as follows,
where r is the SNR of sidelobe receiver without considering the effect of beamforming expressed as
A sensitive eavesdropper can improve the SNR r through increasing received power gain, decreasing path loss and noise power. When r is increased to infinity, we have
Remark 4: The average SINR in the sidelobe region tends to converge when Eve increases the SNR r to infinity, which indicates that the proposed FRB can provide robust PLS performance.
IV. PLS PERFORMANCE OPTIMIZATION
In this section, we study the PLS-oriented FRB optimization problems by first formulating the achievable SR. We study two cases of interests, i.e., without/with the location information of eavesdropping, both turn out to be NP-hard. We first study the case without eavesdropping location information, and propose a SOA to minimize the sidelobe peak of the FRB-resultant beampattern outside the DARR. We then study the case with eavesdropping location information, and propose a BCDLA to find the optimized FOI vector.
A. Problem Formulation
The proposed FRB has a deterministic beampattern for a given FOI vector f. Since Eve may be located at any region except target region (θ T , R T ), the beampattern at Eve's location is not constant. When Eve locates exactly in the maximum sidelobe peak of the FRB-resultant beampattern, the situation of information leakage is the worst. Therefore, we need to design a FRB strategy to choose the FOI vector appropriately for better SR performance.
The achievable rates of Bob and Eve are expressed as
where σ 2 T and σ 2 E represent the noise power of Bob and Eve, respectively, r T and r E denote Bob and Eve's SNR without considering beamforming, respectively.
The SR is defined as the difference of rates between the legitimate channel and the wiretap channel, i.e.,
Then, the SRM problem is formulated as follows,
In the proposed FRB transmission scheme, the level of resultant beampattern is mainly determined by the FOI vector f and the array parameters. We assume that Bob can be located accurately and the signal energy of the confidential information is intentionally focused on this region. Thus, the resultant beampattern gain of Bob is constant and maximum. As the location of Eve is unknown, the worst SR appears in the maximum sidelobe peak. Thus, the SRM depends on the peak level of sidelobe outside the DARR. In order to study the sidelobe suppression performance of FRB, we temporally ignore the effects of r T and r E . To this end, the SRM problem (P1) boils down to finding the optimal f to minimize the sidelobe level, which is expressed as follows,
where g( f m ) is the beampattern of the m-th FDSA with N elements and the FOI f m , expressed as follows,
Therefore, the problem (P2) is equivalently expressed as
Our target is to achieve optimal SR for Bob with the proposed FRB under two scenarios of interests, namely without/with location information of eavesdropping. In subsequent subsections, we propose two optimization algorithms for these scenarios.
B. FRB-SR Optimization Without Eavesdropping Location Information
In practice, the location of eavesdropping is generally unknown. In order to implement FRB against unlocalized eavesdropping, the sidelobe of FRB-resultant beampattern should be as low as possible. In such case, the objective of SRM problem (P1) is to minimize the maximum sidelobe peak, and the optimization problem is
The beampattern gain varies with the location (θ, R) and FOI vector f. When the feasible solution of (P4) is confined in a set with M elements, the process is similar with the route selection of the well-known traveling salesman problem which is NP-hard [44] . Therefore, the optimization problem of (P4) is non-convex and NP-hard, which cannot be solved directly [21] . To this end, an efficient algorithm named as SOA will be introduced to solve the problem.
1) Seeker Optimization Algorithm:
We adopt SOA to find an approximate optimization solution for problem (P4). SOA is a population-based heuristic search algorithm, which attempts to simulate the action of human's intelligent search for realparameter optimization with their memory, experience and uncertainty reasoning [45] - [47] . The individual of this population is called seeker. An empirical gradient (EG) search Determine EG direction D s by (39) 6:
Determine step length V s by (40) 7:
end if 11: if Fitness( F t s )<Fitness(P s ) then 12 :
end if 14: if Fitness( F t s )<Fitness(g) then 15 :
end if 17 : end for 18 : end for 19: return f = g direction and a step length are calculated to update seeker's position in each iteration. SOA shows better performance than existing algorithms, such as particle swarm optimization algorithm, genetic algorithm, in the optimization of interference suppression of linear antenna arrays [48] . As shown in Algorithm 1, SOA operates on a position matrix F ∈ Z M×S , which is treated as S potential solutions or FOI vectors for problem (P4). Line 1 is used to initialize the seeker's position F, search direction D ∈ Z M×S and step length V ∈ Z M×S , best personal position P ∈ Z M×S and best global position g ∈ Z M×1 . Line 4 is used to decrease the weight from 0.9 to 0.1 with the increasing of the iteration number so as to gradually improve the search precision. The search space of SOA is treated as a gradient field, and an EG can be determined to guide the seeker's search direction by evaluating his or his neighbor's current or historical position change [46] , [47] . Line 5 determines the EG direction of the s-th seeker, which is expressed as
where r 1 and r 2 are random numbers uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1], sgn(·) is a signum function returning the value -1, 0 or 1. The subscript s of matrix notation denotes the s-th column vector of matrix. The seekers use three EGs, i.e., proactive, egotistic and altruistic to determine their direction by evaluating their own current or historical positions or their neighbors. Proactive direction d pro means the seekers may be proactive to change his search direction, and exhibits a goal-directed behavior by predicting and guiding the future behavior according to their past behaviors. Egotistic direction d ego denotes the seekers go towards their historical best position through cognitive learning. Altruistic direction d alt represents the seekers cooperate explicitly and go towards the desired goal by the social learning. Line 6 of Algorithm 1 computes the search step length V of the s-th seeker, which is expressed as
where g and F rand are the best seeker and a randomly selected seeker from F, respectively, r 3 is a random number. u is the input of fuzzy reasoning module, following the fuzzy rule "If f itness value i s small, then step length i s shor t", expressed as
where I s is the number of F after sorting the fitness values. u max and u min denote the maximum membership degree value and minimum membership degree value, respectively. In this paper, we set u max = 0.95, u min = 0.0111 [45] . Thanks to the fuzzy rule, the better seeker position is, the shorter the step length will be. Lines 7-10 update the seeker position F t s . Lines 11-16 update the personal best position p s,b and global best position g b according to the new position F t s . In Algorithm 1, the fitness function is defined as
where P L (R) is the path loss factor. p ⊂ ms is the feasible set of (cos θ n , R m,k ) defined by Corollary 3.
2) Complexity Analysis of SOA:
The computational complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(T × S × F), where F is the complexity of fitness function in (42) . According to the Corollary 3, assuming k = 0, ∀m in (64), the number of potential sidelobe peak is 2M × N for even M or M × N for odd M. Thus, the computational complexity of SOA becomes
Since directly solving the (P4) is difficult when the eavesdropping location is unknown, we have to use SOA, a heuristic search algorithm, to find the optimal FOI vector. In next subsection we study the SR optimization problem for FRB with the location information of eavesdropper, and a more efficient algorithm is proposed to solve this problem.
C. FRB-SR Optimization With Eavesdropping Location Information
If we have known that the eavesdropper locates in a specific location, the objective of (P3) is to find a set of suitable FOI to generate the minimum beampattern gain in the eavesdropping region, which is also NP-hard. Here, we resort to the block coordinate descent (BCD) method [49] - [51] to handle the non-convex non-smooth FRB-SR problem with multi-block variables. Note that BCD has been employed to solve the complicated power allocation problem in wireless communication systems [52] . 
1) A Brief Introduction of BCD Method:
Consider the following optimization problem,
closed convex set, and f :
i=0 X m → R is a continuous function. The BCD method is one of the efficient approaches to solve the above optimization problem [49] . At each iteration of this method, the function is minimized only with respect to a single block of variables while the rest of the blocks are held fixed. More specifically, in the r -th iteration of the algorithm, f is updated as follows
where f
2) BCD Algorithm for (P3):
Following the updating rule of BCD in (44), we assume that the FOI f m is updated in the r -th iteration by solving the following problem
Let us define the function g( f m ) as a single block variable. Obviously, (P5) is a typical convex optimization problem of quadratic function with one variable. It is easy to find that the optimal solution of problem (P5) is expressed as (45) where (38) and (45), we can compute the FOI f m by decomposing N-fold angle formula of sine function and solving N-degree univariate polynomial equation. However, it is complex and difficult to solve when N > 4. We use LA method to solve the solution f m of (45) . As shown in Fig. 8 , we compute all the positive peak points and negative peak points from f min to f max . Then, a suitable peak interval [ f neg , f pos ] is chosen according to the FOI constraint. A linear function g 1 ( f ) is used to approximate the function g( f ) in such interval, which is expressed as
Thus, we get the solution of (45) as follows
4) BCDLA Algorithm: The BCDLA algorithm is summarized as the whole procedure to solve the problem (P5) as shown in Algorithm 2. Line 1 initializes the parameters, where ε > 0 and r stop ∈ N are the condition value of stopping BCDLA iteration. Line 4 computes the minimum f m with (45) . Lines 5-6 implement LA. Lines 7-8 update the variables. Line 9 is the stopping criterion of BCDLA.
5) Complexity Analysis of BCDLA:
The computational complexity of Algorithm 2 is O(r max ), where r max is the maximum iteration. Compared with SOA, BCDLA is much simpler and efficient to find an optimal frequency offset for SRM on specific location.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we highlight the advantages of the proposed FRB schemes by comparing the SR performance with other reference schemes through numerical simulation.
A. Simulation Assumption
Unless otherwise specified, all simulations consider the linear array with isotropic antenna element, the channel model follows Section II, and the transmitter knows the location of Bob at (θ T , R T ) = (90 • , 500 m). The SR upper bound denotes that Eve's achievable rate decreases to zero in (36) . As shown in Fig. 9 , in order to study the profile of SR performance, we assume Eve may move along three trajectories, i.e., the trajectory T 12 in angle-domain, the trajectory T 13 in range-domain and the trajectory T 14 in angle-rangedomain, while keeping Bob's location as a constant. The system operates at 73 GHz with an average transmit power P T = 40 dBm. The FOI upper bound is f max ≤ 10 −5 f c . We assume the noise power of Bob is σ 2 T = −100 dBm. The noise power of Eve is equal to that of Bob in sidelobe suppression simulation while varies in sidelobe randomization simulation. According to the NYC experimental result in mmWave LoS communications [9] , [10] , we adopt a logdistance model to model the path loss as
where α = 69.8, n = 2, R denotes propagation distance in meter.
B. FRB Without Eavesdropping Location
We use SOA algorithm to select the FOI vector for a minimum FRB-resultant sidelobe peak when the eavesdropper's location is unknown. As shown in Fig. 10 , the achievable SR of the proposed FRB is compared with existing FRB and RAB. Fig. 10(a) shows that the SR of the proposed FRB generally keeps very high level except in the target region where Eve colocates with Bob. Fig. 10(b) -(c) demonstrate that the mainlobe paths of the existing FAB and RAB bring a long slit band, where the SR is almost zero and the information leakage is worst. Fig. 10(d) is the SR profile near target angle in angledomain. Assume Eve is along the trajectory T 12 or T 13 of Fig. 9 , where R = 380 m or R = R T + f c d cos θ/ f . The SRs of the proposed FRB along these two trajectories are more robust than FAB and RAB. In addition, both FAB and RAB exist zero SR region along the mainlobe path. Outside the DARR, because the beampattern of the proposed FRB is restrained by destructive superposition of subbeams, the mainlobe path that is inherent in FAB and RAB does not exist, thus the eavesdropper can not effectively intercept the confidential signal. Therefore, the proposed FRB improves the SR through sidelobe suppression. Especially, when Eve has low SNR, it can eliminate the zero SR outside the DARR. The proposed FRB is superior to the existing angular beamforming schemes.
C. FRB With Eavesdropping Location
In order to keep the FRB-resultant sidelobe beampattern as low as possible at the eavesdropping location, we adopt the BCDLA algorithm to compute the FOI vector quickly for the proposed FRB. Fig. 11(a) shows the converging process of the BCDLA algorithm, where each curve starts from a set of randomly selected FOIs. After about 4 iterations, the difference of FOI vectors between the r -th iteration and the (r − 1)-th iteration converges to zero. Fig. 11 with θ = 89 • or 90 • . As FAB is angle-dependent but rangeindependent, the array factor does not vary with the range parameter in the specific direction. While the proposed FRB is angle-range-dependent, it can use eavesdropper's range information to minimize the sidelobe level. Thus, the SR of the proposed FRB is close to the upper bound and superior to that of FAB. 
D. Impact of Antenna Number
We compare the SR performance with different subarray antenna number when M = 15. As shown in Fig. 12(a) , assume Eve moves along trajectory T 14 of Fig. 9 with θ = 90 • , i.e., the target direction, we observe that the SR of the proposed FRB is improved as the subarray antenna number N increases. This is because that the subarray sidelobe peak decreases when N increases, which generates low resultant sidelobes. Furthermore, the proposed FRB achieves higher SR than FAB because FAB can not suppress the beampattern along the mainlobe path. Fig. 12(b) demonstrates the angle-averaged SR 3 on each observation range. As the number of subarray antenna N increases, the angle-averaged SR of FRB also increases. Since the angle-averaged SR of FRB with N = 51 is close to that of FAB with N = 11, we think that increasing N of FRB can not only help to eliminate the zero SR threat outside the DARR, but also achieve good SR performance that is comparable to FAB. Fig. 13 makes a comparison of the proposed FRB performance in the same region when M N is fixed. As shown in Fig. 13(a) , the maximum sidelobe peak decreases with the increasing of subarray number M from 3 to 7 and increases again after M is more than 21. When the ratio N M approaches 1, the sidelobe peak tends to be optimal. Fig. 13(b) demonstrates the SR profile of the proposed FRB on trajectory T 14 : θ = 90 • , where the SR performance becomes better when the M is close to N. According to (20) , large M provides more DoF for the phase shift factor ρ(θ), which is beneficial to restrain the FRB-resultant sidelobe. On the contrary, the subbeam's mainlobe number and the subbeam's sidelobe level increase as M increases, which is disadvantageous for FRB to suppress the sidelobe peak. Therefore, we should strike a good balance between M and N when M N is a constant.
E. Impact of Maximum Frequency Offset Increment
Fig. 14 illustrates the impact of maximum FOI f max on the secrecy outage probability (SOP) and the bandwidth of the proposed FRB. Define the SOP as
where γ denotes the SR threshold. Fig. 14(a) shows that the SOPs of FRB decrease as the f max increases in low SR threshold. Especially, when FRB is simplified to FAB by setting f max = 0, the SOP of FAB is high as 205 times of FRB with f max = 10 −4 f c when γ = 1 bit/s/Hz. As γ > 6 bit/s/Hz, the SOPs for different f max trend to unify and approach 1. Since the proposed FRB uses the frequency offset to suppress the mainlobe path outside the DARR, larger f max provides more DoF to eliminate the zero SR threat. Thus, the performance of SOP in low γ improves with the increase of f max .
Assume a double sideband system of FAB with bandwidth W F AB = 2( f h − f c ), where f h and f c are the upper bound frequency and carrier frequency, respectively. And the frequency spectrum range of FRB does not exceed the bandwidth of FAB. Then the relative bandwidth (RBW) of FRB is expressed as Fig. 14(b) demonstrates that the RBW of the proposed FRB decreases with the increase of f max . On the other hand, the decrease velocity of RBW will slow when the bandwidth of FAB increases. The RBW only decreases 0.15% when W F AB = 1 GHz and f max = 10 −5 f c . In general, the order of magnitude of bandwidth in mmWave is at least gigahertz. Thus, the decrease of FRB bandwidth produced by frequency offset is very tiny and can be ignored in mmWave wireless communication systems. Fig. 15 illustrates the SR robustness of the proposed FRB against the sensitive eavesdropper using theoretical results and Monte Carlo simulation results when the SNR of Bob is fixed to 20 dB. As shown in Fig. 15(a) , assume eavesdropper locates in the target direction with R = 300 m, the SRs of the proposed FRB and FRB plus AN are higher than the existing FAB when the noise power σ 2 E of Eve decreases. Even when σ 2 E drops to zero, the SR of the proposed FRB plus AN still keeps high level approaching the upper bound. The reason for this is that the propose FRB uses sidelobe suppression to generate low sidelobe, and leverages sidelobe randomization to produce AN towards eavesdropper. Thus, the SINR of Eve is robust against the decrease of noise power. Fig. 15(b) also demonstrates the SR robustness of the proposed FRB plus AN against the Eve's SNR. According to (31) , when Eve increases r to infinity, the SINR tends to converge. Thus, the proposed FRB plus AN can provide robust SR performance outside the DARR and address the security threat of mainlobe path that is inherent in angular beamforming.
F. Robust Secure Performance
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a novel FRB scheme to improve PLS by exploiting the DoF of frequency offset supported by FDSA in mmWave band. Three transmission beamforming techniques, namely FAB, RAB and FRB, are studied within a unified FDSA architecture and instantiated by different setups of FOI. The SRM problems without/with eavesdropping location information are studied, where SOA and BCDLA algorithms are proposed to solve these complicated problems, respectively. According to the theoretical analysis and simulation results, we show that the proposed FRB achieves better SR performance than existing angular beamforming methods, i.e., FAB and RAB. The regime of low SR is eliminated completely in our proposed scheme when f max ≤ 10 −4 f c , which solves the problem of zero SR in the mainlobe direction that is inherent in most of the existing beamforming schemes. Thus the SOP of FRB reduces two orders of magnitude in R s < 1 bit/s/Hz. The FRB-SR performance is improved by increasing of the subarray number M, subarray element N and maximum FOI f max . The sidelobe randomization of inverted subarray subset is used to tackle the sensitive eavesdropping. In the future, we will further study the optimization of subarray architecture, the PLS with UPA or other antenna arrays and the applications in some specific scenarios, such as the secure communication for cellular-connected unmanned aerial vehicle network. 
The proof of Lemma 4 is finished.
